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S ony v .  Me riv ie nt i (Cont.! 
Sony brought suit in 1983 based on breach of contract and 
negligence theories, while defendants asserted defenses under 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act tCOGSAl. Sony, prior to the 
trial, agreed that COGSA governed the action although it was 
not a basis in the original complaint. Under COGSA, Sony 
established a prima facia case merely by proving that the goods 
were received in good condition but unloaded damaged. Terman 
Foods Inc. u. Omega Lines. 707 F.2d 1225 (11th Cir. 1983). 
The defendants argued that a latent defect caused the accident. 
This is listed in COGSA as an excepted cause which is sufficient 
if established to rebut a prima facia case, 46 U. S.C. App. 
§1304(2). Alternatively, defendants argued that if there was 
liability, it should be limited according to COG SA at $500 per 
package, 46 U.S.C. App. §130415), and that the number of 
packages should be one or fifty-two, but not 1,320. The district 
court disagreed, however. and awarded Sony damages for the 
full loss. This appeal followed. 
ISSU E: (1) Whether the deck crane's motor failure was the 
result of an excepted cause. 1.e .. a latent detect. 
(2) Whether the definition of "package", within 
COG SA, should be interpreted to equal fifty-two or 1,320. 
ANALYSIS : The Eleventh Circuit resolved the first issue re­
garding liability by holdmg that the district court's findings 
were not clearly erroneous and therefore should not be over­
turned on appeal. Fed.R.Civ .P. 521 a 1: McAllister u. United States. 
348 U.S. 19. 2U I 19541. At the trial both parties introduced 
expert testimony relating to the cause of the motor failure. The 
defense witness claimed there were tiny cracks in the motor's 
piston. a latent detect. while the plaintiff offered expert 
testimony that the cause was a malhmctioning stop switch, 
which the carrier either knew of or should have known existed. 
The inconsistencies were resolved as a matter of law in favor of 
Sony because its theory explained areas that the defense could 
not. The court of appeals a!!J'eed that the defense failed to rebut 
plaintiffs prima facia case by establishing that the cause was a 
latent detect and affirmed the ruling. 
The second issue deals with the ambiguous wording of§ 1304151 
of COG SA which provides that the carrier will not be liable tor 
more than $50U per package unless the value is inserted in the 
bill of lading. Sony did not put the value on the bill of lading but 
the district court determined that each of the 1,320 cartons was 
a ''package" and limited liability at $660,000, which covered the 
cassettes actual cost of$424,765.44, which Sony was awarded. 
The circuit court analogized the instant case to Vegas u. Cam­
pania Anonima Venezolana de Nauegacion, 720 F.2d 629 1 11th 
Cir. 1983), where the cargo was 109 cartons consolidated onto 
two pallets. Under "No. of Pkgs." on the bill of lading the carrier 
wrote "2" and later tried to limit liability to $1,000 based on 
§1304151 when the shipment was damaged. The Vegas court 
realized that both the individual cartons and the master cartons 
I pallets I could have fit the definition of package. To resolve this 
ambiguity they looked to the purpose of COGSA which "was to 
set a reasonable limitation on liability which carriers by law 
could not reduce by contract." I d. at 630 I citing Allstate Ins. Co. 
u. Inuersiones Nauieras Imparca, CA., 646 F.2d 169, 171 15th 
Cir. Unit B 1981ll. In effect, Congress wanted to protect the 
shipper where the carrier who issued the bill of lading later 
claimed unrealistically low damages based on the bill oflading, 
when the goods were later lost or damaged. Consistent with this 
purpose the court could not find justification for limiting liabil­
it.v because the cartons were consolidated. 
Here. the case was clearer because the udl of lading said 1,320 
cartons and not fifty-two. Defendants, however, used Hayes­
Leger Associates, Inc. u. M/V Oriental Knight, 765 F.2d 1076, 
1082 I 11th Cir. 1985) as precedent that "where the shipper 
overstates the number of packages in a container, the COGSA 
liability limitation should be applied to the actual number of 
packages in a container." In that case the bill of lading stated 
"2,641 pes" under packages when there were actually five con­
tainers which held these pieces. Taken to its logical extreme 
such an interpretation of Hayes-Leger would mean that the 
container itself should be considered one COG SA package for all 
shipments. This approach was rejected by the court because in 
Hayes -Leger the description "was insufficient to indicate to the 
carrier that the goods were packaged." /d. at 1089 n.9. In the 
present case it is not necessary to look beyond the bill of lading 
because the description there is enough to indicate that Sony's 
goods were packaged. The Eleventh Circuit therefore rejected the 
defendants arguments and affirmed the district court's damages. 
Dav id A .  Pelle grino '90 
NUNL EY v .  M N  DAUNTL ESS COLOCOT RONIS 
U nited State s C ou rt of Appeal s, F ift h C ircu it, 23 Ja nua ry 1989 
863 F .2d 1190 
A ba rge ow ne r w ho aba nd oned rec ove ry e ffort s  for a ba rge t hat had broke n away a nd wa s su nk a s  a re sult of a n  inev itable 
accide nt is not liable f or a subse que nt c ollision w it h  t he su nke n  ba rgt>:.-T he c ost for bu oy ma rkings of a sun ke n  bar ge a re t o  
be borne by t he ow ne r if at t hat time t he re is no ev ide nce of aba nd onme nt . O ne w ho ha s c ont racted t o  c onduct dewate ring 
at t he site of a su nke n  ba rge ca n not bring a c la im for rec ove ry a s  a v olu nta ry sa lv or. 
FA CT S: lt began Januar_v lb. 1�74. with what is now referred 
to as the "Great Barge Breakawa\· ... As a result of mclement 
conditions on the Ivhssissippi River during the Winter of 197:1-
1914. large gram shipments. a longshoreman's strike. and an 
maccessibi!It_v to upstream ports. thousands of barges were 
docked m the Port of New Orleans. On the evenmg in questiOn. 
manv vessels broke from their moorings and struck Comb1 
Line·s tComb11 barges causing them to tear away from their 
moonngs. One of the barges struck was the Lash.lt was the only 
one that was not recovered. 
Diligent eHorts by Combi were expended to recover Lash. 
Sitings in Algiers Lock Forebay tAlgiersl and an area near the 
Tenneco Oil docks produced two barges below the surface that 
could have been Lash. The Algiers' siting was 67 feet below the 
water and the Tenneco's was 37 feet below, with the latter 
"constituting a hazard to navigation." Based upon the readings 
from a magnetometer and fathometer, Combi concluded that 
the barge near Algiers was in all probability Lash. This vessel 
did not pose a threat to navigation and Combi did not bother to 
mark it or raise it. 
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The United States Coast Guard found the other vessel and 
marked it on two occasions in early 1974. 
In July. 1977 a fire broke out on the M/V Dauntless Colocotronis 
t Dauntless I as it approached the Tenneco refinery. A search of 
the river produced a sunken barge that was idenuhed as the 
missing Lash. The Dauntless had struck this barge causmg the 
pump room of her ship to be filled with crude oil and a tire ensued. 
ChemLmk had contracted with the Coast Guard to provide the 
equipment to remove water and oil from the Dauntless. The v1ce 
president of ChemLink, Captain Waiter Nunley. aided m de­
watering the Dauntless. 
Dauntless brought an action against Combi allegmg negli­
gence in leaving its barge in a vulnerable location and m tailing 
to mark or remove it from the river. The district court lound 
Combi to be free from negligence because it had reasonabi_v 
concluded that the vessel near Tenneco was not its barge. 
The Coast Guard brought suit against Combi for its expenses 
in marking the barge and the district court granted the award. 
Captain Nunley brought a salvage claim against the Dauntless 
(Continued .. .J 
Nunley v. Daunt less (Cont.) 
claiming that his dewatering efforts were performed in an indi­
vidual capacity not as a representative of ChemLink. 
ISSUES: (I) Was Combi negligent in failing to conduct a good 
faith search for its barge prior to its decision to abandon if' 
(2) Is the Coast Guard entitled to recover for its 
marking expenses? 
( 3) Does Captain Nunley have a valid salvage claim"1 
A NA LYSIS: This court affirmed the district court and held 
that Combi used its best efforts to search for its sunken barge. 
The first day after the "barge breakaway" Combi joined the 
Coast Guard in a helicopter search. Subsequently it employed a 
skilled magnometer and fathometer reader to search under the 
water. The only option Combi did not employ was that of divers. 
However, river conditions were not conducive to a human 
search team. According to trial testimony, those river condi­
tions lasted well into the summer of 1974, months after the 
breakaway. 
As to the claim of abandonment by Combi, the district court 
noted that, "a valid abandonment occurs through the act of 
deserting the property without hope of recovery or intention of 
returning to it." In this case more than three years had elapsed 
since Combi ended its search and the Dauntless's accident. "In 
that interval Combi may safely be deemed to have abandoned 
the [Lash]." 
In February, 1974 Combi notified its insurers that it had failed to 
locate the barge and stated its intent to abandon it. "Since Combi 
was a non-negligent owner and had abandoned its vessel before 
the Dauntless collision . . . [Combi I was free from negligence. " 
The three prong test set out for determining a valid salvage 
claim includes "(2) voluntary service rendered when not re­
quired as an existing duty or from a special contract. " The 
Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 ( 1880). The district court found that 
Nunley's actions were not voluntary but rather were required 
by the contract ChemLink had entered into to supply tugs, 
pumps, and manpower to remove oil and water from the Dauntless. 
ChemLink's agreement contemplated that the efforts of Nunley 
would be utilized. As vice president he was often required to be on 
call 24 hours a day. Thus his claim to be working independently 
as a salvor, as opposed to working as per his contract, failed. 
The River and Harbor Act, 33 U.S.C. §409 (the Wreck Act), 
provides that, "when a vessel . . .  is wrecked and sunk . .  . 
accidentally or otherwise it shall be the duty of the owner . . .  to 
immediately mark it with a buoy or beacon." On January 30, 
197 4, the buoy that the Coast Guard had initially placed on the 
vessel was reported missing and the Coast Guard replaced it 
with a second larger buoy. Less than one month later the second 
buoy was reported missing. After the Dauntless's accident the 
Coast Guard maintained another buoy at the site of the wreck. 
Because the Coast Guard's first set of marking expenses was 
within three weeks of the sinking of Lash and at that time 
Combi was not considered to have abandoned it, the Coast 
Guard was entitled to recover for the first two markings. How­
ever, there is no recovery for the last buoy. By 1977 Combi had 
abandoned the sunken vessel. 
Melanie A .  Woo d '90 
STEPHE NSON v. Mc LEA N CO NTRACTI NG COMPA NY 
Unite d States Court of Appeals, Fourt h Circuit, 2 3  December 1988 
863F.2d 34 0 
An in divi dual injured w hile wor king on a crane barge to construct a bridge does not sustain his in jury from an 
unseawort hy vessel in navigable waters nor does he quali fy as a "seaman " under t he Jones Act . 
FACTS: Stephenson, the plaintiff-appellant was an employee 
of the McLean Contracting Company (McLeanJ which was 
building a bridge across the Choptank River in Maryland. He 
was assigned to the Annapolis, a crane barge being used as a 
plattorm to construct the bridge's support columns. He was 
injured March 26, 1986 while using a cutting torch on pilings in 
a cofferdam, a box-like structure designed to keep the river's 
water from the work area. Stephenson lost his tooting on some 
loose gravel, precipitating a fall to the bottom of the cofferdam, 
which was alongside another crane barge owned and used by 
McLean. The fall resulted in injuries for which he now sues. 
Stephenson brought this action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland under the Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C. App. §688 (aJ, and the maritime doctrine of unseaworthi­
ness. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment because Stephenson did not meet the definition of a 
··seaman·· as set forth in the three prong test of Whitting ham u. 
Sewer Construction Co. 541 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1976l and addition­
ally because the plaintiff was injured in the cofferdam which 
was not part of the vessel. The plaintiff appealed. 
ISSUE : Does a crane barge used as a platform to aid in the 
construction of a bridge constitute an "unseaworthy appurtenance 
of a vessel in navigable water·· which would allow recovery under 
the doctrine of unseaworthiness? 
A NA LYSIS: In affirming the dismissal, the Fourth Circuit 
examined the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. §688 (a), which provides: 
"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course 
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of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action 
for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury . . . .  " 
The test the court of appeals used to determine if Stephenson 
met the definition of a "seaman" was first set out in Whittingham 
v. Sewer Construction Co. 541 F.2d at 436. There, the court 
determined under a three prong test that a worker must be a 
· permanently attached" crew member of a vessel in navigable 
waters to qualify as a "seaman" under the Jones Act. The court 
of appeals followed the district court's assumption that 
Stephenson was permanently attached to the Annapolis and 
that it was in navigation, satisfying the first prong of the Whit­
tingham test. Stephenson's duties in constructing the 
framework of the bridge such as welding and cutting pilings did 
not serve·· naturally and primarily as an aid to navigation" thus 
tailing to meet the second prong of the Whittingham test. The 
court found that the plaintiff as a bridge construction worker, in 
performing functions unrelated to the tasks of transportation, 
tailed to meet the test of a "seaman" as set forth in Whittingham. 
The court also determined that Stephenson's unseaworthiness 
claim did not present a genuine issue of material fact to go to the 
JUry. For recovery under the maritime doctrine of unseaworthi­
ness, the court again looked to Whittingham, where the plaintiff 
must show he was "doing the work of a seaman" and that his 
injury was caused by an "unseaworthy appurtenance of a vessel 
in navigable waters." Deciding that plaintiffs claim was without 
merit, the court concluded that Stephenson was a bridge con­
struction worker when injured, not a seaman, and also that he 
was not working on a vessel, but working on an independent 
work site, the cofferdam, when he was injured. 
Su zanne Remu zzi '90 
